This article focusses on the notion of interpersonal grammatical metaphor as understood in Halliday's model of systemic functional linguistics (SFL). First, the concept of grammatical metaphor as developed in SFL is reviewed and its relation to comparable concepts developed in other linguistic schools is specified. On the basis of a general semiotic-functional characterization of the interpersonal sign in terms of scoping and grounding, I will then define interpersonal grammatical metaphor as involving a doubling of semiosis, viz. a doubling of scoping in its structural-realizational dimension, and a doubling of grounding in its semantic-functional dimension.
(1) a. However, if you imagine you can now buy them back I would advise you to forget all about it. (2) a. Yes, I, yes I think Andrea's put her finger on it. [BNC: HIJ, 220] b. It might perhaps be assumed that families sending girls to be compositors would be those where there was some interest in books, but the evidence is quite fragmentary. [BNC: EVJ, 1149] c. Indeed, it is arguable that the different speeds of financial liberalisation are a prime cause of world trade and savings imbalances. [BNC: AAA, 125] d. Since the report is expected to form the basis for an investigation and possible action by the Serious Fraud Office, it is highly unlikely that it will be published in full. [BNC: A1S, 465] e. It will certainly be held next year. [BNC: HD1, 364] As can be gathered from these examples, it is such types of expressions, amongst others, that have been taken up in appraisal theory (see the second part of this issue), especially under the heading of 'engagement' (Martin 1997) . This approach offers a detailed lexical-semantic categorization of such expressions as evaluations ('appraisals') of propositions and proposals (see especially Martin's approach to appraisal theory), or it focusses on the role such expressions have in negotiating inter-subjective positions in a speech exchange (see especially White's elaboration of appraisal theory). Expressions such as the examples given above also play a central role in McGregor's semiotic approach to interpersonal grammar, which is centred around the notions of scoping and framing, and which explores such types of expressions in terms of the interclausal interpersonal relationship of 'conjugation' they construe.
However, although it is especially such expressions -expressions that
Halliday has brought to attention under the heading of 'interpersonal grammatical metaphor ' (or 'interpersonal metaphor') in the early 1980s -that form the focus of the study of appraisal and the study of scoping in language, the notion of 'grammatical metaphor' is only rarely mentioned, and does not play any significant role in these more recent studies of interpersonal meanings and constructions. The very concept of 'grammatical metaphor' itself is even looked upon with scepticism by the proponent of the semiotic theory of scoping and framing (see McGregor 1990: 41) .
A possible explanation for this relative neglect of grammatical metaphor in the two frameworks mentioned above, is that, even though grammatical metaphor has been interpreted as one of the most significant innovations in systemic functional linguistics (SFL) in the past two decades (Butler 1989 : 5, Martin 1992 , the specific nature of its internal organisation as a construction type -i.e. a linguistic sign seen as a coupling of form and meaning -has never been characterized in precise terms. This paper is intended as first step towards such a semiotic-functional characterization of interpersonal grammatical metaphor.
I will propose to define interpersonal grammatical metaphor as a doubling of semiosis: a doubling of scoping in structural terms, and a doubling of grounding in semantic terms. This characterization builds on a refined definition of the interpersonal sign as such, in which the concepts of 'scoping' and 'grounding' play a fundamental role as structural and semantic notions, respectively. The argument will be built up in three steps. In a first move, the initial motivation for introducing the concept of 'interpersonal grammatical metaphor' into SFL will be reconsidered (Section 2), and on the basis of this, I will justify the need for a semiotic characterization and specify the approach to such a characterization that will be taken in this paper (Section 3). As a second step, the nature of the interpersonal sign in general -whether metaphorical or not -will be looked into (Section 4). The final move will then focus on defining 'interpersonal grammatical metaphor' and its various sub-types (Section 5).
4

Whence interpersonal grammatical metaphor?
The aim of this section is twofold.
[1] First, it serves to explain the introduction of a concept such as interpersonal grammatical metaphor into SFL against the background of the design of SFL as a functional model of language. As such, this section also forms an appraisal of the notion of grammatical metaphor -a linguistic concept which is unique to the SFL framework.
[2] Although the concept of grammatical metaphor itself hardly has any equivalents in other theories, distinct linguistic phenomena covered by this concept have received extensive treatment in other frameworks, albeit never in the integrative sense offered by the notion of grammatical metaphor. A second aim of this section is thus to contextualize the systemic functional concept into a wider theoretical and descriptive background.
The interpersonal component in SFL
Before turning to the introduction of interpersonal grammatical metaphor into SFL, I will consider the theoretical context, i.e. the systemic functional conception of the interpersonal component of language, into which Halliday incorporated the notion of interpersonal metaphor.
In Halliday's (1994; Halliday & Matthiessen 2004 ) version of SFL, the interpersonal organisation of an utterance is structured in terms of a Mood + Residue pattern. The Mood comprises the Subject of the clause, the Finite (which encodes grammatical number, primary tense and modality), polarity markers, and modal adverbs (if present). In this conception, it is the Mood element which is seen as carrying the burden of the utterance as an interactive event, and hence, it is through different options available for the Mood element that the interpersonal component is manifested in language. The different systems pertaining to options that are realized in the Mood element are specified on two different levels: the level of SPEECH FUNCTION on the one hand, and the level of MOOD and MODALITY on the other hand (see Figure 1) . 3 The system of SPEECH FUNCTION deals with the negotiation of meaning in discourse, it focusses on an utterance as a linguistic exchange, i.e. on the way in which an utterance is (to be) taken in a speech interaction. It is organized around two primary dimensions, as shown in Figure 1 . First, what is being negotiated in a speech interaction is either information or 'goods-&- Thibault (1995: 81ff.) speaks of a contrast between a "semiotic-discursive" versus a "physicalmaterial" negotiation (However, we will return to the interaction between a semiotic-discursive and a physical-material encoding in discussing grammatical metaphor below; see Section 5.). Davidse (1998: 152) views language as being exchanged either on an "informational axis" or on a "volitional axis". I will refer to this dimension as the TYPE OF EXCHANGE.
The second dimension of the system of SPEECH FUNCTION focusses on dialogue as a 'give-and-take' interaction. This is formalized in the system of DIRECTION whose respective locations in the overall interpersonal system are highlighted in Figure 1 . The remainder of this section will focus on how the introduction of grammatical metaphor into the model of interpersonal grammar was initially motivated in SFL.
Metaphors of mood
The term 'grammatical metaphor' is based on an earlier distinction made by
Halliday between congruent and incongruent grammar, and it is incongruent expressions which later came to be reconceived as grammatical metaphors. The notion of incongruence is first highlighted in Halliday's (1984) paper called "Language as code and language as behaviour", 4 in which he focusses on the relationship between system (language as code, as a potential) and process (language as actual behaviour) in the interpersonal component of language. The general aim of this paper is to show how systems are actualized in dialogue, and how an analysis of dialogue leads to a refinement of the system. The starting point is the interpersonal model as described above and set out in Figure 1 , and the concentration on the relationship between system and process turns out to be a focus on the relationship between the options that are systemically possible, in the system of SPEECH FUNCTION, and the realization of these options in the lexicogrammar of MOOD. A congruent realization is defined as an unmarked, typical realization, or a realization which "will be selected in the absence of any good reason for selecting another one" (Halliday 1984: 14 (1a)- (1f) above.
In his 1985 overview of SFL, Halliday re-defines incongruent types of expressions as grammatical metaphors. In contrast with another type of metaphor which we will focus on below, examples such as sentences (1a)-(1e) and those in 
Metaphors of modality
A second general type of interpersonal grammatical metaphor as defined by Halliday pertains to the area of modality. Halliday claims that modal meanings are most congruently expressed by modal elements in the clause, i.e. modal operators and adjuncts (certainly, probably and the like). Metaphors of modality diverge from the congruent pattern in that, here, a modal meaning is construed outside the proposition that is being modally assessed. This is made possible in two types of constructions: projecting mental processes, as illustrated in examples (1a) and (1b) above, and relational processes, as in examples (1c) Criteria which Halliday adduces to define interpersonal metaphors of modality are similar to features that have been brought up in connection with these expressions in other frameworks. The two most important of these are the following. First, the proposition that is being modally assessed is the major
[information] that is being negotiated in the dialogue, and not the evaluating expression, even though it constitutes the matrix clause. This is shown by the fact that it is the evaluated proposition which is being taken up by a question tag (Halliday 1985: 333; see also Aijmer 1972: 47, 52; Nuyts 1990: 583) . 5 Compare (5a) which illustrates a metaphorical reading to (5b), which shows a literal interpretation.
(5) a. I think Jane knows, doesn't she? b. I think Jane knows, don't I?
A second feature is the possibility of transferred negation (Quirk et al. 1985 (Quirk et al. : 1033  referred to as negative-raising in formal approaches). In other words, when the proposition assessed is negative, the negation can either be expressed in the proposition itself (6a), or in the evaluating expression. 6 In the latter case it is regarded as being 'transferred' (from the subordinate clause to the evaluating expression, i.e. the main clause, see example (6b)) (Halliday 1985: 333 ; see also Bublitz 1992) : (6) a. I think Jane doesn't know. b. I don't think Jane knows.
A general feature of interpersonal metaphor: Semantic tension
The metaphorical nature of interpersonal grammatical metaphor has been specified in terms of a tension between a 'literal' and a 'figurative' interpretation,
i.e. a tension which is equally present in the traditional notion of (lexical) metaphor. This feature, which has especially been pointed out by Martin (e.g. Martin 1995: 37; 1997: 26-27) , has not gone unnoticed in other frameworks (see Aijmer 1980: 13ff) . An interpersonal grammatical metaphor can have at least two uptakes in dialogue, i.e. it can be interpreted metaphorically or literally. This can be illustrated by means of the following examples given by Martin (1995: 39) and quoted from well-known detective stories: This tension between literal and metaphorical meaning in interpersonal metaphor is also clear in instances of verbal play based on metaphors of mood.
The possibility of a literal interpretation in examples such as (9) is well-known:
(9) -Could you pass the salt, please.
-Yes, I could do that. [without any action undertaken]
Interim conclusion and outlook
In the previous section, we have considered the introduction of two types of interpersonal grammatical metaphor into the systemic-functional model of interpersonal grammar. We have focussed on the major features of metaphors of modality and metaphors of mood, and the general characteristic of semantic tension which they share. From this review, it is clear that a wide range of phenomena which are well-known in other approaches to language are united under the systemic functional concept of grammatical metaphor. The concept of a certain 'metaphoricity' involved in these phenomena, although not completely absent in other frameworks, provides a unique perspective on these phenomena.
However, from the above review, it is equally clear that, although interpersonal metaphor is incorporated into the system network of interpersonal grammar, its 'metaphorical' nature is only motivated in general terms which link grammatical metaphor to the more well-known traditional (lexical) metaphor: i.e. in terms of two different interpretations, a literal one and a metaphorical one, underlying the expressions at hand. More precisely, no specification is offered of the internal semiotic organisation of grammatical metaphor as a type of construction -as a linguistic sign.
Metaphor is inherently a second-order phenomenon in language: an expression can only be recognized as metaphorical by virtue of there being a comparable, non-metaphorical (type of) expression. What is more, as a secondorder expression, metaphor builds upon non-metaphorical resources in language (see also Taverniers 2003a) . Any definition of interpersonal grammatical metaphor must therefore be rooted in a specification of the interpersonal sign as such. Conversely, if interpersonal grammatical metaphor is to be defined as an interpersonal construction type, the general definition of the interpersonal sign must be broad (or abstract) enough to account for grammatical metaphor as well.
If we reconsider the diversity of expressions discussed above -metaphors of modality, metaphors of mood, and the non-metaphorical counterparts for both types -in light of their treatment in other frameworks, there appear to be at least two contexts that offer a unifying perspective on non-metaphorical and The semiotic-functional definition of the interpersonal sign which will be given below will be based on two dimensions, representing the two sides of the interpersonal construction type as a linguistic side, viz. content (signifié, the semantic-functional side of the sign) and expression (signifiant, the formrealizational side of the sign). The first of these is scoping as a structural (realizational) concept. The second dimension is intuitively clearer, and is also better known from the literature: it is the semantic dimension of rhetorical modification, of which the epistemic modification/qualification of other frameworks forms a part. This second dimension will be defined in terms of the concept of grounding from the framework of cognitive grammar. This concept, as it is theorized by Langacker and further re-interpreted by Davidse, forms a very precise semantic-functional framework for characterizing interpersonal 'meaning'.
4. The nature of the interpersonal sign 
The expression side of the linguistic sign: Scoping, prosody, operator-status
In this section I will bring together a number of concepts that have been introduced in the literature to specify the way in which interpersonal meanings are realized in language. These concepts, which will be important in the characterization of interpersonal metaphor, are summarized in Table 1 . (10) and (11), pertains to the possibility of interpersonal elements/meaning being "scattered prosodically through the unit" (Halliday 1994 (Halliday /1985 emphasis MT), while the latter refers to the tendency for interpersonal meanings to be realized at the boundaries (the beginning or the end) of a clause.
(10) I don't want never to see him again, I don't. (G.B. Shaw, Pygmalion).
(11) I think I might perhaps have walked out too from all the accounts.
Nuyts ( MT]" (Halliday 1994: 197) .
The content side of the linguistic sign: Grounding
The concept of grounding, as it will be used here in defining the semantic side of the interpersonal sign, is to be understood in its technical sense derived from cognitive grammar. In this framework, grounding is related to three other notions, viz. quantification, instantiation and type specification, which Langacker specifies in explaining the conceptual structure of clauses (and of nominal groups).
The grounding aspects in an utterance are those elements that tie the utterance to the speaker-now context, i.e. the ground. According to Davidse's reinterpretation of the grounding function, 10 which will be adopted here, the clausal grounding elements are primary tense, modality and person-deixis of the Subject (Davidse 1997 (Davidse , 1998 Quantification, realized by means of polarity, pertains to Davies' (1979: 105) notion of "occurrence value": negative polarity means 'occurrence value = nil'; positive polarity means 'occurrence value = at least one'.
In view of Halliday's model of the interpersonal structure of the clause in terms of a Mood/Residue patterning, the basic distinction is between type specification on the one hand (encoded in the Residue), and instantiation, quantification, and grounding on the other hand (encoded in the Mood). The instantiating, quantifying and grounding elements in the clause together constitute an interpersonal domain into which the utterance is anchored, and it is precisely this anchoring which turns the clause into an utterance that can be negotiated (i.e. argued about) in the speech interaction.
The four functions by which Langacker models the conceptual structure of the clause are interdependent: grounding presupposes an instantiated and quantified type specification, instantiation presupposes quantification, and quantification presupposes type specification. In this sense, the different semantic functions distinguished by Langacker are said to indicate a kind of layering:
within a structure as a whole, the type specification is regarded as "a kind of nucleus", or the "innermost functional layer", while a grounding predication is added as "the outmost layer" (Langacker 1991: 54, 143 ). This description ties in with the formal-realizational features of interpersonal elements noted in the previous sub-section.
Conclusion: Primary scoping and primary grounding
In this section, the Mood element of the clause has been characterized in terms of 
Interpersonal grammatical metaphor as a doubling of semiosis
The aim of this section is to specify the nature of interpersonal grammatical metaphor as a linguistic sign. This specification will be guided by two principles:
(1) in the definition, both the interpersonal nature and the metaphorical nature of interpersonal grammatical metaphor as a sign must be specified, and (2) 
Metaphors in the exchange of information
Let us start with the area of the exchange of [information] , indicated at the left side in Figure 3 . In this area, there is a simple opposition between a nonmetaphorical construal of modal meanings and a metaphorical one, embodied in metaphors of modality. We have seen in the previous section that the nonmetaphorical construal of modality (see area 2 in Figure 3 ) refers to an encoding of modal meanings within the Mood element (i.e. especially through modal operators and modal adjuncts). As described in Section 2.3, metaphors of modality (see area 4 in Figure 3 ) differ from this type of construction in that a modal meaning is construed outside the Mood element of the proposition which is assessed, and hence, outside the structure of this proposition as a whole. Taking as a basis the definition of the interpersonal sign proposed in the previous section, interpersonal grammatical metaphor can now be further defined as a construction in which an extra-propositional element (especially a projecting process or a relational construction) has (rhetorical) scope over a proposition and grounds that proposition. Importantly, because the proposition which is assessed does have its own scoping elements (encoded in its Subject and finiteness), and, as such, its own grounding, the separate element in metaphors of modality provides a secondary scoping and a secondary grounding for an already grounded proposition.
This can be shown as in Figure 4 . In this perspective, the metaphorical nature of 20 interpersonal metaphors of modality lies in the fact that they are based on a doubling of scoping (structurally) and a doubling of grounding (semantically). The type of grounding -the type of interpersonal domain -which is encoded in secondary scoping elements is a further specification of the occurrence value of the proposition in terms of the speaker's (and/or hearer's, in interrogatives) evaluation of the validity of the proposition, or the evidence the speaker has for asserting or denying something. Therefore, secondary scoping elements in metaphors of modality can be argued to encode a grounding into a domain of validity or a domain of evidentiality.
Metaphors in the exchange of goods and services
In the area of the exchange of [goods-&-services], the situation is somewhat more complex, in that here, there is a basic variation between a non-metaphorical construal (the imperative, as we have seen above) (14), and two types of metaphorical construals: metaphors of mood (15) Let us now consider the various ways in which offers and commands can be construed in order to specify which role multi-modality plays in nonmetaphorical and metaphorical types of constructions. The area of commands construed by the imperative -i.e. a typical construal, in Halliday's frameworkcan be taken as a starting point. What is typical of imperatives, as opposed to indicatives, is the absence of a Mood element. However, this absence only pertains to the purely linguistic level, or the semiotic-discursive level in Thibault's terminology: an Instantiator, and also a certain type of finiteness (to be further specified below) of the process which is designated are presupposed to be 'realized' non-linguistically, at the level of the physical-material negotiation. In other words, an Instantiator and a type of finiteness are presupposed to be carried by reality itself as a medium. Furthermore, these two aspects, which surface in the tag of an imperative (e.g. Be quiet, will you), are recoverable from the speech situation: the presupposed Instantiator in a typical imperative is 'you', and the finiteness which is implied is modal/volitional (the imperative appeals to the volition of the hearer). In this vein the physical-material manifestation of an
Instantiator and a type of finiteness is a type of grounding. This feature of imperatives has been emphasized by Davidse (1991 Davidse ( /1999 as well as Thibault (1995).
As we have seen above, Halliday (1994: 363) The difference between interpersonal metaphors and attitudinal modifications or factive constructions lies in the fact that the latter are based on an attitudinal evaluation of an existing proposition, or in Halliday's (1994: 264ff) terms, a "pre-projected fact" (see also Davidse 1995 on fact projection): the instantiation of the evaluated proposition is not dependent on the evaluative expression.
Conclusion
In The division into two levels is inspired by layered models of language in general (Functional Grammar, Role and Reference Grammar), and by detailed studies of a range of phenomena in relation to which this distinction has proved to be insightful (e.g. adverbials (Davies 1967) or conjunction (Davies 1979 , Verstraete 1998 ). With respect to this division into two levels, the semantic definition of the interpersonal sign given in this section focusses on the modal level only. See also the following note on the realizational characterization of the interpersonal sign.
8. Regarding the realizational characterization of the interpersonal sign, I take scoping to be the general type of structure underlying interpersonal signs. I believe that framing is a special, limiting case of scoping, i.e. framing incorporates the features of scoping, but not vice versa.
9. Nuyts focusses on epistemic modal expressions.
10. The differences between Langacker's and Davidse's views can be summarized as follows. Langacker (1991: 33) defines the type specification as the verb and its arguments, and secondary auxiliaries. Taking into account a radical distinction between argument roles (ideational components) and interpersonal functions such as Subject, Object, Complement (a distinction which is crucial to SFL), Davidse regards the Subject as the primary Instantiator of the clause, and also assigns it a grounding function, in terms of its person-deixis (see Davidse 1997: 421; 1998: 156) . To specify the role of the Subject, which is by definition mapped onto one of the arguments that the verb takes, is a tricky
issue. An alternative solution, which disentangles both interpersonal vs.
ideational layers, and syntagmatic vs. functional structuring, is proposed in Taverniers (2002: 515-533) .
11. The dimension of interpersonal grammatical metaphors focussed on here suggests an inherent performativity as a further characteristic of grammatical metaphors. 'Performativity', which is intrinsically linked to the notion of grounding as speaker-now anchoring, proves to be a keynote concept in defining fully grammaticalized modality (see Nuyts 1993: 951ff ., Verstraete
